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 Abstract 
This paper explores the incentives for energy efficiency induced by the Euro-
pean Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) for installations in the energy 
and industry sectors. Our analysis of the National Allocation Plans for 27 EU 
Member States for phase 2 of the EU ETS (2008-2012) suggests that the price 
and cost effects for improvements in carbon and energy efficiency in the energy 
and industry sectors will be stronger than in phase 1 (2005-2007), but only be-
cause the European Commission has substantially reduced the number of al-
lowances to be allocated by the Member States. To the extent that companies 
from these sectors (notably power producers) pass through the extra costs for 
carbon, higher prices for allowances translate into stronger incentives for de-
mand-side energy efficiency. With the cuts in allocation to energy and industry 
sectors these will be forced to greater reductions, thus the non-ET sectors like 
household, tertiary and transport will have to reduce less, which is more in line 
with the cost-efficient share of emission reductions. The findings also imply that 
domestic efficiency improvements in the energy and industry sectors may re-
main limited since companies can make substantial use of credits from the 
Kyoto Mechanisms. The analysis of the rules for existing installations, new pro-
jects and closures suggests that incentives for energy efficiency are higher in 
phase 2 than in phase 1 because of the increased application of benchmarking 
to new and existing installations and because a lower share of allowances will 
be allocated for free. Nevertheless, there is still ample scope to further improve 
the EU ETS so that the full potential for energy efficiency can be realized. 
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1 Introduction∗ 
The European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) is the world’s larg-
est emissions trading system and the first international trading system for CO2 
(Ellermann & Buchner, 2007). It was launched in January 2005 and covers 
around 12,000 large greenhouse gas emitting installations in the energy and 
industry sectors: combustion installations with a rated thermal input capacity of 
at least 20 Megawatts, refineries, coke ovens, steel plants, and installations 
producing cement clinker, lime, bricks, glass, pulp, and paper. In total, the EU 
ETS covers about 50 % of Europe’s CO2 emissions and 40 % of its total green-
house gas emissions. The EU ETS is made up of consecutive trading periods. 
The first trading period – often considered to be a “learning phase” – lasted from 
2005 to 2007 (phase 1); the second trading period coincides with the Kyoto 
commitment period from 2008 to 2012 (phase 2). According to a recent pro-
posal by the European Commission, the third trading period (phase 3) will last 
from 2013 to 2020 (CEC, 2008a). As the European Union’s key climate policy 
instrument, the EU ETS is expected to help the EU and the EU Member States 
reach their short- and long-term greenhouse gas emissions targets in a cost-
efficient way (CEC, 2000). 
Emissions trading and incentives for energy efficiency and innovation 
The EU ETS reflects a shift in environmental policy from command-and-control 
type environmental regulation, such as setting technology standards, towards 
market-based instruments. The EU ETS is a cap-and-trade scheme, where a 
central authority sets a limit (cap) on the amount of a pollutant that can be emit-
ted by companies’ installations covered by the scheme. Companies are issued 
emission allowances and, by the end of a particular period, must surrender the 
number of allowances equivalent to the amount of emissions caused by their 
installations during that period. Otherwise sanctions have to be paid. Compa-
nies may emit more emissions than their initial allocation if they purchase extra 
allowances from other companies. Likewise, companies with low-cost abate-
ment measures may choose to reduce emissions in order to sell their surplus 
allowances. Thus, companies with high cost measures may purchase allow-
ances while companies with low cost measures may buy or sell allowances on a 
market where demand and supply schedules can be matched and an equilib-
rium market price emerges which reflects the scarcity of allowances in the sys-
                                            
∗ Forthcoming  in  Energy Efficiency (http://www.springer.com/environment/journal/12053). 2  Incentives for energy efficiency in the EU Emissions Trading Scheme 
tem. Since all participants face the same marginal abatement costs, overall re-
duction costs are minimized (static efficiency). The price for allowances also 
sets monetary incentives to adopt new, more energy- and carbon-efficient tech-
nologies and services, and to develop fundamentally new or significantly im-
proved solutions (dynamic efficiency). In the EU ETS, these incentives not only 
apply to the firms directly covered by the EU ETS, there are also indirect effects 
in other parts of the value chain. For example, since the additional costs of cov-
ering greenhouse gas emissions are at least partially passed on and included in 
the product (e.g. electricity) prices, the EU ETS also increases incentives for 
improved energy efficiency on the demand side, such as in energy-intensive 
industries (e.g. aluminum producers), or private households.1 In terms of inno-
vation policy, an emission trading system represents a demand-oriented tech-
nology regulation which leaves the technology selection process to the market 
rather than the regulator, i.e. companies are free to choose the most cost-
efficient technology. Because emission trading systems allow for static and dy-
namic efficiency, they are often considered to be superior to other types of regu-
lation.2  
The role of National Allocation Plans in the EU ETS for energy efficiency 
The extent of the technological change induced by the EU ETS crucially de-
pends on the scheme's design (Gagelmann and Frondel, 2005; Schleich and 
Betz, 2005). Some key design elements of the scheme are governed by the EU 
Emission Trading Directive (CEC, 2003) and others are determined by country-
specific National Allocation Plans (NAPs) of the individual Member States. At 
the macro level, NAPs define the cap, i.e. the total quantity of allowances avail-
able in each period (ET-budget); at the micro level, they determine how these 
allowances are allocated to individual installations. The size of the ET-budget 
indicates whether the EU ETS is environmentally effective in terms of reducing 
CO2-emissions. More stringent ET-budgets will lead to higher prices for Euro-
pean Union Allowances (EUAs) and thus greater incentives to improve energy 
and carbon efficiency, ceteris paribus. In the first phase, these incentives were 
                                            
1  Higher carbon efficiency is typically the result of improvements in energy efficiency. How-
ever, this is not necessarily the case for fuel switching, and it does not apply to carbon cap-
ture and storage either (IPCC, 2005). We do not always make this distinction in the paper 
and the terms "carbon efficiency" and "energy efficiency" are used interchangeably.  
2   See Fischer (2005) for a recent overview of this topic. Incentives for energy efficiency in the EU Emissions Trading Scheme  3 
 
low since the ET-budgets turned out to be rather lenient, resulting in low prices 
for EUAs.3  
At the macro level, the NAPs also determine to what extent the individual Mem-
ber States rely on the EU ETS to achieve their emission targets. In particular, 
the NAPs establish how to “split the pie” between the EU ETS trading sectors 
on the one hand (i.e. energy and industry sectors) and the household, services 
and transport sectors (i.e. non-trading sectors) on the other hand. The com-
bined emission budgets for trading and non-trading sectors also determine to 
what extent Member States rely on domestic efforts and to what extent on the 
Mechanisms of the Kyoto Protocol to meet their emissions targets, i.e. Interna-
tional Emission Trading, the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and Joint 
Implementation (JI). In general, the use of credits from Kyoto Mechanisms can 
have direct and indirect impacts on energy efficiency. First, a greater use of 
these credits would translate into higher emission budgets for the EU ETS trad-
ing sectors and/or the non-trading sectors. This direct effect implies that, in the 
short run, fewer domestic measures would then be necessary to reach the na-
tional emission target. Second, the so-called “Linking Directive” (CEC, 2004a) 
allows companies to use credits from Kyoto Mechanisms to cover their emis-
sions under the EU ETS. Since the prices for credits from CDM and JI projects 
tend to be lower than those for EUAs (World Bank, 2008), the use of credits 
from CDM and JI projects dampens the price for EUAs and thus lowers price 
and cost incentives for energy efficiency within the EU. The diffusion of energy- 
and carbon-efficient technologies may then be shifted from the EU to develop-
ing countries and emerging economies.  
The allocation rules specified at the micro level for existing and new installations 
and for closures shape the incentives for innovation and for long-term invest-
ments in low-carbon energy technologies and energy-efficiency in the industry 
sectors. All NAPs need to be approved by the European Commission based on 
the criteria specified in the Emission Trading Directive (CEC, 2003a) and in the 
NAP guidance (CEC, 2004b; CEC, 2005). 
                                            
3   In addition, EUAs from phase 1 generally could not be transferred into phase 2 (see also 
Schleich et al., 2006). However, such banking of EUAs will be allowed starting from phase 
2 onwards.  4  Incentives for energy efficiency in the EU Emissions Trading Scheme 
Objective, methodology and organization of the paper 
In this paper, we analyze the notified and approved NAPs of the EU 27 Member 
States for phase 2 in terms of their incentives for innovation and energy effi-
ciency. In particular, we evaluate the cost and price incentives for energy effi-
ciency implied by the stringency of the cap. At the macro level, this analysis is 
based on three stringency criteria: the difference between the notified (and ap-
proved) ET-budgets for phase 2 to (i) verified historical emissions in 2005, (ii) 
the size of the ET-budgets in phase 1 and (iii) projected emissions in 2010. We 
also assess whether the burden-sharing between trading and non-trading sec-
tors is cost-efficient. This assessment is based on the criterion of a proportional 
split of the required emission reductions. Comparing the sizes of the submitted 
and notified ET-budgets allows us to elicit the impact of the European Commis-
sion’s assessments on the cost and price incentives for energy efficiency and 
on the cost-efficiency of the EU ETS in phase 2. Further, we explore to which 
extent companies’ use of Kyoto Mechanisms may crowd out domestic efficiency 
improvements in the energy and industry sector in the European Union. We cal-
culate the maximum number of credits from Joint Implementation and the Clean 
Development Mechanism that companies are allowed to use and relate these to 
the stringency criteria derived above. To explore the micro-level incentives for 
energy efficiency, we assess the allocation rules for existing and new installa-
tions and for closures as specified in the NAPs based on insights from eco-
nomic theory. Relating the rules for phase 2 to those for phase 1 at a general 
level we can then identify areas where the incentives for energy efficiency have 
changed. Finally, we correlate the findings with the design features for a future 
EU ETS as laid out in the European Commission’s proposal for a Directive for 
phase 3 as part of the "Climate action and renewable energy package" pub-
lished in January 2008 (CEC, 2008a,b,c).  
To summarize, the paper contributes to the existing literature by evaluating the 
current rules of phase 2 of the EU ETS across Member States in terms of their 
impact on energy and carbon efficiency. Compared to prior work by Betz et al. 
(2006a), we extend and update the analysis at the macro level, and introduce a 
new focus on primary and end use energy efficiency at the macro and micro 
levels as well as the new proposal for the third phase (CEC, 2008a).  
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 consists of the macro-level analy-
ses of the stringency and cost-efficiency of the ET-budgets. In Section 3 we as-
sess the allocation rules at the micro level. A summary table in the Annex pro-
vides a comprehensive overview of the relevant features of the macro and mi-Incentives for energy efficiency in the EU Emissions Trading Scheme  5 
 
cro plans for the Member States included in this survey. Finally, Section 4 
summarizes the main results and offers guidance for the future design of the EU 
ETS (and possibly other emissions trading schemes), aiming at improved incen-
tives for energy efficiency. The concluding section also relates the main findings 
to the recent proposal by the European Commission for a Directive governing 
phase 3 of the EU ETS.  6  Incentives for energy efficiency in the EU Emissions Trading Scheme 
2  Incentives for energy efficiency at the macro level 
The stringency of the combined national ET-budgets of all the Member States 
determines the relationship between the supply and demand for EUAs and 
therefore influences the price and cost incentives for energy efficiency im-
provements. In phase 1 and phase 2, the ET-budgets are typically made up of 
budgets for installations from individual industry and energy sectors. Initially, 
these sector budgets are determined by the respective Member States, usually 
based on a combination of historical emission levels or average benchmarks, 
growth projections, emission saving potentials and a compliance factor required 
to reach the overall ET-budget. Then the sector budgets are allocated to indi-
vidual installations at the micro level, typically based on their emissions share in 
a base period (rather than on output or capacity shares). Technically, most EU-
15 Member States apply sector-specific compliance factors to guarantee that 
bottom-up allocation to individual installations does not exceed the sector budg-
ets. In the simplest case, Member States set up only two budgets: one for all 
energy and one for all industry installations. Since most of the new Member 
States will easily reach their Kyoto-targets, they neither use sector budgets nor 
compliance factors at the installation level. 
For phase 1, verified emissions data (CEC, 2006c) revealed that very few coun-
tries allocated EUAs in 2005 below the actual 2005 emission levels of the ET-
sector (Austria, Greece, Italy, Ireland, Spain and the UK). As a consequence of 
this surplus allowance, in May 2006, prices for EUAs plummeted from around 
€ 26/EUA to around € 10/EUA and to well below € 1/EUA towards the end of 
the first trading period. According to Kettner et al. (2007), the surplus for 2005 
amounts to about 100 million EUA. Since the emission level in the absence of 
the EU ETS cannot be determined (it is counterfactual), the real extent of possi-
ble over-allocation cannot be determined. Ellerman and Buchner (2008) tenta-
tively suggest that a substantial part of the surplus may have resulted from 
abatement activities. According to a survey conducted among participants by 
Point Carbon (2007), 65 % of respondents initiated internal abatement projects 
in 2006. This figure is significantly higher than in Point Carbon’s survey for 
2005. Also, the importance of innovation as a strategic response to the EU ETS 
was highlighted by a survey among the scheme’s participants conducted on 
behalf of the European Commission (McKinsey and Ecofys, 2006). Neverthe-
less, the surplus of EUAs and the correspondingly low price provided little addi-
tional incentive to improve energy and carbon efficiency in phase 1. Together 
with high uncertainty about governments’ commitment to long-term targets, this Incentives for energy efficiency in the EU Emissions Trading Scheme  7 
 
meant that firms were not strongly motivated to develop energy-efficient and 
low-carbon technologies and services in phase 1 (Montgomery, 2005).  
For phase 2, therefore, the Commission developed its own criterion, based on 
2005 verified emissions data, economic growth and carbon intensity trends 
(CEC, 2006a, p. 3ff). Applying this criterion has led the European Commission 
to require budget cuts in all but four of the assessed plans (Denmark, France4, 
the UK and Slovenia). The total ET-budget originally proposed by the 27 Mem-
ber States in their notified NAPS amounted to about 2,325 million t of CO2e p.a. 
(one EUA corresponds to one ton of CO2e).  The European Commission re-
duced the total cap by 10.4 % to 2,083 million EUAs p.a.5 In absolute terms, the 
budget adjustments were highest for Poland (~76 million EUAs p.a.) and Ger-
many (~29 million EUAs p.a.). In percentage terms, the budgets of Latvia 
(~56 %), Estonia (~48 %) and Lithuania (~47 %) were reduced the most. The 
summary table in the Annex shows these cuts in the ETS budgets for phase 2 
in absolute and relative terms for each Member State. The required budget cuts 
were much higher for the new EU-12 Member States (175 million EUA/a or -
25.4 %) than for the EU-15 Member States (68 million EUA/a or -4.1 %).6 
The European Commission not only adjusted the ET-budgets but also set a 
maximum amount of credits from Kyoto Mechanisms that companies may use 
to cover their emissions (see Tables 1 and 2). Taking into consideration the de-
cisions of the European Commission, the maximum use of the Kyoto Mecha-
nisms for companies under the EU ETS would be about 274 MtCO2e/a for the 
27 Member States examined (see Table 1). Without the European Commis-
sion’s intervention, this figure would have been significantly higher 
(374 MtCO2e/a). Table 1 also shows the sum of the governments' intended and 
companies' allowed purchases of credits from the Kyoto Mechanisms 
(383 MtCO2e/a). Whether companies will purchase these credits crucially de-
                                            
4   France’s NAP was only accepted without a reduction of its allocation because France with-
drew the NAP it submitted first and reduced its ET-budget according to the EC’s formula (-
14.7%, or -22.9 million EUA/a). 
5    The NAPs submitted by the Member States together with the European Commission’s 
decisions are available at http://ec.europa.eu/environment/climat/2nd_phase_ep.htm. For 
all Member States we use figures from approved NAPs, even for those which are challeng-
ing the EC’s decisions in court (Latvia, Estonia, Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary). 
6   The set of EU-12 Member States includes the new Member States which have entered the 
European Union in 2004 and 2007: Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Estonia, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Rumania, Slovakia and Slovenia. The remaining Member 
States will be referred to as EU-15 Member States. 8  Incentives for energy efficiency in the EU Emissions Trading Scheme 
pends on their costs relative to the price for EUAs which in turn depends on the 
stringency of the ET-budgets. 
Table 1:   Notified and accepted use of Kyoto mechanisms by governments 
and companies 
Governmental use of KM Permitted company use of KM Sum of max. KM use
in million ERU and CER / a
EU-27 Notified 109.4 373.8 483.3
Accepted 109.4 273.9 383.3  
Source: Fraunhofer ISI based on NAPs of Member States and NAP decisions of European 
Commission  
 
2.1 Stringency  of  ET-budgets 
In order to assess the stringency of the ET-budgets for phase 2 we used the 
following three criteria comparing the approved ET-budgets to: 
•  the verified emissions for 2005 (excluding reserve for new entrants); 
•  the size of ET-budgets in phase 2 (including reserve for new entrants); 
•  the projected emissions for 2010 (including reserve for new entrants). 
Since the type and number of installations participating in the EU ETS differs 
between both phases – e.g. as a consequence of the European Commission’s 
attempt to harmonize the coverage of installations, or because some Member 
States (e.g. the UK) decided to opt out installations in phase 1 – adjustments 
had to be made for a meaningful comparison.7 We illustrate the impact of the 
European Commission’s assessment by applying the three stringency criteria 
both to the notified and the approved ET-budgets. 
The results for the three criteria appear in Figures 1, 2 and 3. In each of these 
figures, a positive value indicates that the ET-budget for phase 2 is larger and a 
negative value that the ET-budget is smaller than the respective reference 
point. Figures for the EU-15 Member States are shown on the left of the bold 
line, and for the EU-12 Member States on the right of the bold line. For com-
parison, the striped bars depict the results for the approved ET-budgets. Aggre-
gate figures for approved and notified NAPs are shown in Table 2. 
                                            
7  For a detailed description on the methodology, see Rogge et al. (2006). Incentives for energy efficiency in the EU Emissions Trading Scheme  9 
 
In general there are differences across Member States and between the groups 
of EU-15 Member States and EU-12 Member States, but qualitatively, the three 
criteria paint a similar picture. Of the 27 approved NAPs analyzed, the vast ma-
jority now meet our three stringency criteria owing to the European Commis-
sion’s budget cuts. Before the Commission's ruling though, only nine Member 
States fulfilled all three criteria, namely Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Ireland, It-
aly, the Netherlands, Spain, the United Kingdom and – as the only EU-12 Mem-
ber State – Slovenia. In particular, while the notified EU-15 ET-budgets for 
phase 2 were much stricter than for phase 1, most notified EU-12 ET-budgets 
appear to be rather generous. However, because of the European Commis-
sion’s decisions to substantially cut several ET-budgets, the EU-wide ET-budget 
is expected to be significantly more ambitious in phase 2 than in phase 1 of the 
EU ETS. Our analysis suggests that, on average, the ET-budgets in phase 2 
are about 12.8 % lower than historical emissions in 2005, 12.9 % lower than the 
budgets in phase 1 and 15.7 % lower than projected emissions in 2010.8  
In conclusion, the price and cost incentives to improve energy and carbon effi-
ciency are likely to be substantially higher in phase 2 than they were in phase 1. 
However, the need for domestic emission reductions via improved energy and 
carbon efficiency in the energy and industry sectors may still be rather low. This 
is revealed by comparing the maximum amount of credits from the Kyoto 
Mechanisms that companies may use to cover their emissions under the EU 
ETS with the reduction requirements implied by the three criteria (see Table 2).  
 
                                            
8  When interpreting the quantitative results it should be kept in mind that these figures do not 
fully account for closures and new entrants. 10  Incentives for energy efficiency in the EU Emissions Trading Scheme 
Figure 1  ET-budgets for phase 2 and COM adjusted budgets com-










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































1 - Ratio ET-budget phase 2 to emissions 2005
1 - Ratio ET-budget phase 2 to emissions 2005 (COM decision) 
∑ ET-budget 2 (COM) - VET 2005 EU-15:  -232.1 Mt CO2e/a  (-15.8%)
∑ ET-budget 2 (COM) - VET 2005 EU-12:     -17.7  Mt CO2e/a  (-3.7%)
∑ ET-budget 2 (COM) - VET 2005 EU-27:  -249.7 Mt CO2e/a  (-12.8 %)
EU-15 EU-12
 
Source:   Fraunhofer ISI based on NAPs of Member States and NAP decisions of European 
Commission, (CEC, 2006b), registry data (CITL as of October 23, 2006), UNFCCC 
(2006) and EEA (2006) 
 Incentives for energy efficiency in the EU Emissions Trading Scheme  11 
 
Figure 2  ET-budgets for phase 2 and COM adjusted budgets com-




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































2 - Ratio ET-budget phase 2 to ET-budget phase 1
2 - Ratio ET-budget phase 2 to ET-budget phase 1 (COM decision)
∑ ET-budget 2 (COM) - ET-budget 1 EU-15:   -205.4 Mt CO2e/a  (-13.1%)
∑ ET-budget 2 (COM) - ET-budget 1 EU-12:     -64.2 Mt CO2e/a  (-12.5%)
∑ ET-budget 2 (COM) - ET-budget 1 EU-27:   -269.6 Mt CO2e/a  (-12.9%)
EU-15 EU-12
 
Source:   Fraunhofer ISI based on NAPs of Member States and NAP decisions of European 
Commission, (CEC, 2006b), registry data (CITL as of October 23, 2006), UNFCCC 
(2006) and EEA (2006) 12  Incentives for energy efficiency in the EU Emissions Trading Scheme 
Figure 3  ET-budgets for phase 2 and COM adjusted budgets compared 
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































3 - Ratio ET-budget phase 2 to projection 2010
3 - Ratio ET-budget phase 2 to projection 2010  (COM decision)
∑ ET-budget 2 (COM) - Projection 2010 EU-15:  -211.5 Mt CO2e/a   (-13.5%)
∑ ET-budget 2 (COM) - Projection 2010 EU-12:  -115.1  Mt CO2e/a  (-22.4%)
∑ ET-budget 2 (COM) - Projection 2010 EU-27:  -326.5 Mt CO2e/a   (-15.7%)
EU-15 EU-12
 
Source:   Fraunhofer ISI based on NAPs of Member States and NAP decisions of European 
Commission, (CEC, 2006b), registry data (CITL as of October 23, 2006), UNFCCC 
(2006) and EEA (2006) 
 
Table 2  Results for three criteria at aggregate level of 25 NAPs and com-
parison with companies’ limit on the use of Kyoto Mechanisms 
 in million 
EUA




in % of ET-
budget phase 1
 in million 
EUA




EU-15 Notified -173.7 -11.3% -137.8 -8.4% -143.9 -8.8% 259.3
Accepted -232.0 -15.7% -205.4 -13.1% -211.5 -13.5% 222.5
EU-12 Notified 140.3 22.1% 110.7 16.1% 59.9 8.7% 114.5
Accepted -17.7 -3.7% -64.2 -12.5% -115.1 -22.4% 51.4
EU-27 Notified -33.3 -1.5% -27.1 -1.2% -84.0 -3.6% 373.8
Accepted -249.7 -12.8% -269.6 -12.9% -326.5 -15.7% 273.9
KM limit for 
companies
ET-budget in phase 2 compared to
VET 2005 ET-budget in phase1 Emission projections for 2010
(criterion 1) (criterion 2) (criterion 3)
 
Source:   Fraunhofer ISI based on NAPs of Member States and NAP decisions of European 
Commission, (CEC, 2006b), registry data (CITL as of October 23, 2006), UNFCCC 
(2006) and EEA (2006) 
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2.2  Contribution of ET-sectors versus other sectors 
In this sub-section we examine whether the macro level incentives for improve-
ments in energy and carbon efficiency in the ET-sectors and the other domestic 
sectors are cost-efficient. To do so, we assess whether the sizes of the ap-
proved ET-budgets are consistent with an efficient distribution of reduction ef-
forts between the ET-sectors (energy and industry) and non-ET-sectors 
(household, tertiary and transport). Again, we compare these results with the 
budgets implied by the notified NAPs. The default economic guideline is that the 
size of the budgets for the ET-sector and the non-ET-sector should be deter-
mined such that the total abatement costs are minimized, i.e. that the marginal 
(social) costs of the abatement measures realized in the trading and the non-
trading sectors are equal.9 Thus, sectors with cheaper measures should make a 
bigger contribution (relatively) to achieving a country’s emission target. Ideally, 
marginal abatement costs should also include macro-economic effects such as 
production displacement in energy-intensive sectors facing export or import 
competition from regions where companies’ CO2 emissions are not regulated. 
Otherwise, for small open economies with relatively large shares of energy-
intensive industries facing such international competition, this displacement ef-
fect may be large enough to warrant a redressing of the burden sharing be-
tween the ET and the non-ET-sectors.10 However, according to many studies 
(including Böhringer et al., 2006; Criqui and Kitous, 2003; or Peterson, 2006), 
the marginal (social) abatement costs of the ET-sector are lower than the 
abatement costs of other sectors in the economy (even without considering the 
ETS-companies' option to use “cheap” credits from the Kyoto Mechanisms).11 
Therefore, the ET-sector should, contribute more than its proportional share to 
the required emission reductions. 
To derive a criterion for the cost-efficiency of the ET-budgets, we relate the size 
of the ET-budget in the NAPs to a “hypothetical allocation scenario between 
ETS and non-ETS” (see also Betz et. al, 2004; or Zetterberg et al., 2004). To 
                                            
9  This condition then emerges from the first-order-condition of the cost minimization problem 
for achieving a given emission target. 
10  In practice, such negative effects are likely to be small and limited to a few products includ-
ing primary steel produced from blast oxygen furnaces, aluminum or nitric acid (e.g. Peter-
son and Schleich, 2007; Hourcade et al., 2008).  
11  These results were obtained for lower fuel prices than currently observed. Arguably, sub-
stantially higher fuel prices may lead to a different outcome, since they tend to raise the 
costs for abatement measures available particularly in the ET-sector (e.g. fuel switch). 14  Incentives for energy efficiency in the EU Emissions Trading Scheme 
calculate this hypothetical allocation scenario, we multiply a Member State’s 
burden-sharing or Kyoto target by the share of the ET-sector’s CO2-emissions 
relative to total greenhouse gas emissions (using the data from the national in-
ventories (UNFCCC, 2006). Thus, the hypothetical allocation scenario repre-
sents the budget resulting for the trading sector (biggest parts of energy and 
industry) if all sectors contributed proportionally to achieving a country’s emis-
sion target. Accordingly, if the ET-budget of a Member State was found to be 
higher than the emission budget in the hypothetical allocation scenario, a Mem-
ber State could achieve its Kyoto target at lower total abatement costs by lower-
ing the size of the ET-budget and, at the same time, increasing the amount of 
emissions allowed in the non-ETS sectors.  
Our analysis also accounts for Member States’ intended use of credits from 
Kyoto Mechanisms, thereby increasing the national emission budgets (and con-
sequently also the hypothetical allocation scenario). In our assessment, the 
NAP of a Member State is considered to meet this criterion if the ET-budget is 
not larger than the budget which corresponds to the hypothetical allocation sce-
nario. 
Figure 4 shows the differences between the actual ET-budgets and the hypo-
thetical allocation scenario (in %), again comparing the ET-budgets accepted by 
the European Commission with the ET-budgets notified by the Member States. 
Before the Commission’s ruling, the emission budgets for the ET-sectors in 
most Member States were – often significantly – larger than those which would 
result from a proportional contribution. The striped bars illustrate how the Euro-
pean Commission’s decisions on the NAPs have improved the cost efficiency of 
the ET-budgets for phase 2 budgets: Almost all of the 27 Member States are 
now requested to assign EU ETS budgets that are close to or even clearly be-
low the hypothetical allocation scenario. 
To sum up, from a cost efficiency perspective, the notified ET-budgets would 
have resulted in far too little improvement in energy and carbon efficiency in the 
ET-sectors in most Member States. Thus, without the European Commission’s 
intervention, other sectors like buildings and transportation would have had to 
achieve greater reductions – arguably including also greater improvements in 
energy efficiency – for the national Kyoto targets to be met. 
 Incentives for energy efficiency in the EU Emissions Trading Scheme  15 
 
Figure 4  ET-budget for phase 2 compared to “hypothetical allocation 




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































4 - Ratio of ET-budget phase 2 to hypothetical allocation scenario (with KM) 
4 - Ratio of ET-budget phase 2 to hypothetical allocation scenario (COM decision)
EU-15 EU-12
  
Source:   Fraunhofer ISI based on NAPs of Member States and NAP decisions of European 
Commission, CEC 2006b, registry data (CITL as of October 23, 2006), UNFCCC 2006 
and EEA 2006 
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3  Incentives for energy efficiency at the micro level 
At the micro level we assess the observed allocation rules for existing and new 
installations primarily based on economic theory. In particular, we focus on the 
incentives given by these rules for energy and carbon efficiency. 
3.1  Auctioning versus free allocation for existing installa-
tions 
Allowances may be allocated free of charge or sold at an auction. In general, 
economists prefer auctioning to a gratis allocation (e.g. Cramton and Kerr, 
2002). Under auctioning, the “polluter-pays” principle holds so that the outcome 
may be perceived as “fair”. Auctioning off allowances would also address “wind-
fall profits”: If companies manage to pass on any additional marginal costs (op-
portunity costs) associated with emissions (i.e. price of allowances) to custom-
ers, extra profits (producer rents or “windfall profits”) accrue if allowances are 
allocated for free. In addition, auction revenues could be used for other pur-
poses, including funding for R&D or investment in energy- and carbon-efficient 
technologies. Further implications of auctioning for energy efficiency are dis-
cussed in more detail below.  
Incentives for replacement  
When deciding on the timing for the replacement of an installation, companies 
need to consider the (opportunity) costs for covering carbon emissions for the 
existing installation. If closing the old plant does not alter its allocation, the in-
centives for replacement are identical under free allocation and auctioning (e.g. 
Åhman et al., 2007). A closure would then allow a company to sell the entire 
(free) allocation (and possibly save expenses that might have been incurred for 
purchasing additional allowances to cover all the emissions from the old plant). 
If allowances are allocated for free, the revenues from selling allowances (plus 
expenses saved from not having to purchase additional allowances) are identi-
cal to the expenses for purchasing allowances if allowances are auctioned off. 
However, since in most Member States closures lead to a termination of alloca-
tion, the incentives to replace old installations in the EU ETS are stronger under 
an auctioning scheme than they are under free allocation. Incentives for energy efficiency in the EU Emissions Trading Scheme  17 
 
Updating of base period 
If allowances are allocated for free and if future (arguably tighter) allocation de-
pends on today’s emissions (updating), the marginal costs of energy efficiency 
projects increase by the (opportunity) costs resulting from lower allocation in 
future trading periods (see also Neuhoff et al., 2006). Thus, updating the base 
period distorts companies’ incentives to reduce emissions because future allo-
cations will be lower. As a consequence, updating results in reduced incentives 
to invest in carbon and energy efficiency for installations covered by the EU 
ETS. 
Carbon cost pass through in the power market 
Higher product prices resulting from the pass through of carbon costs translate 
into stronger incentives for energy efficiency on the demand side. The extent to 
which product prices increase when carbon emissions are costly depends, in 
particular, on the responsiveness of demand and on international competition. 
In the power sector, demand is rather inelastic (at least in the short run) – indi-
cating that higher power prices alone do not directly lead to electricity savings – 
and international competition is low (at least from outside the EU). In general 
though, whether allowances are auctioned off or allocated for free does not alter 
the opportunity costs (of additional emissions). From this perspective, the extent 
of the pass through of carbon costs to electricity prices which eventually deter-
mines incentives for energy efficiency on the demand side should be identical 
under auctioning and gratis allocation in liberalized competitive electricity mar-
kets. Of course, the distributional effects on utilities’ profits are quite different. 
Impact of market regulation and structure 
If power markets were regulated, as is for example the case in some US States, 
the impact of emissions trading on power prices would be negligible under free 
allocation. In this case, average costs would only increase to the extent that 
additional allowances needed to be purchased if the free allocation were 
smaller than actual emissions (e.g. Burtraw et al., 2006). By the same token, 
auctioning would result in higher product prices and higher incentives for energy 
efficiency on the demand side. Depending on the price setting mechanism, in-
centives may also differ across customer groups. For example, under Ramsey 
pricing, customer groups with a lower price-elastic demand for electricity would 18  Incentives for energy efficiency in the EU Emissions Trading Scheme 
face higher price increases and incentives for energy efficiency than customer 
groups exhibiting a higher price elastic demand.12 
In liberalized power markets, price increases should not depend on whether 
allowances are auctioned off or allocated for free, unless companies refrain 
from passing through opportunity costs under free allocation because they fear 
this might have regulatory consequences. It is not possible to determine 
whether emissions trading results in higher prices under perfectly or imperfectly 
competitive product market conditions without knowing the shape of the de-
mand curve (e.g. Sijm et al., 2005). For example, under imperfect competition, 
the carbon cost pass through is lower for a linear demand function and higher 
for an iso-elastic demand function than it is under perfect competition.13 
In contrast, if there is imperfect competition on the market for emission allow-
ances, auctioning may result in lower power prices and thus lower incentives for 
energy efficiency on the demand side. Under free allocation, power companies 
have an incentive to exert market power to support a high price of allowances in 
order to charge a higher price for their entire electricity production and increase 
profits (Ehrhart et al., 2008).14 For companies which have to pay for their allow-
ances, this incentive is lower, resulting in lower power prices and lower incen-
tives to improve demand side energy efficiency.  
Diffusion effect 
To assess the effects of allocation on carbon and energy efficiency, the adop-
tion and diffusion of new technologies also have to be taken into account. The 
adoption of more energy-efficient technologies reduces emission costs for the 
investor because the freed-up allowances can be sold on the market, or, be-
cause fewer allowances need to be purchased at auction. This effect is the 
same, independent of whether allowances are allocated free of charge or auc-
                                            
12  In general, Ramsey pricing refers to a linear pricing scheme designed for a multi-product 
natural monopolist, which maximizes social welfare while allowing the monopolist sufficient 
profits to cover total costs. Ramsey pricing then implies prices above marginal costs in in-
verse proportion to the elasticity of demand (see Ramsey, 1927). 
13  For an iso-elastic demand function, the pass through rate will be more than one since, for 
example, an increase in costs by 10 % would also result in a 10 % increase in the power 
price.  
14  The observation that the price for EUAs in the (rather thin) spot market did not drop to zero, 
but instead remained around or above 10 to 15 € per EUA once the number of surplus al-
lowances became common knowledge in May 2006 is consistent with this interpretation.  Incentives for energy efficiency in the EU Emissions Trading Scheme  19 
 
tioned off. But there are differences once the diffusion of new technologies is 
taken into account. The diffusion of more energy-efficient technologies de-
creases the demand for allowances relative to supply, and so the market price 
decreases. If allowances are allocated for free, this diffusion effect means that 
the freed-up allowances will generate less revenue for the investor. In contrast, 
if allowances are auctioned off, the investor benefits in the long run because of 
the reduced allowance price (see Milliman and Prince, 1989). By this token, in-
centives for innovation and energy efficiency are higher under auctioning than 
under free allocation. Whether diffusion actually leads to lower allowance prices 
depends on whether the regulator adjusts the target accordingly. A reduction in 
the ET-budget over time will counterbalance the effect of diffusion on the allow-
ance price. In this case, the differences between grandfathering and auctions 
relating to innovation vanish.15  
Early price signals and planning reliability for investment 
Auctioning off part of the budget right at the beginning of the trading period may 
generate robust early price signals that reflect the scarcity of allowances in the 
market since participants base their bidding behavior on their marginal abate-
ment costs (and expected prices in the secondary market) (e.g. Schmalensee et 
al., 1998; Ehrhart et al., 2005). Such improved price signals may raise the in-
vestment security for carbon- and energy-efficient technologies. To avoid a 
possible bias in the price signal, auctions should be two-sided, i.e. companies 
should not only be allowed to purchase but also to sell allowances (from primary 
free allocation). If only the government were allowed to sell allowances, the auc-
tion price might be biased upwards (compared to the “true equilibrium price”) 
because companies with cheap abatement measures and excess allowances 
would not be able to participate as sellers. Finally, if the auctioning share were 
sufficiently large, governments could auction off appropriate numbers of allow-
ances to cushion price volatility or to set a price floor (Hepburn et al., 2006). 
This would improve the planning reliability for investments in energy efficiency 
because the uncertainty about payoffs would be lower and profits could be 
higher. 
                                            
15  In fact, a clear ranking of environmental policies (emissions trading, environmental taxes, 
standards, emission rates) in terms of innovation is not possible once technology spill-
overs, market structure or the regulator’s response to diffusion are taken into account (see 
Fischer et al., 2003; or Requate, 2005). 20  Incentives for energy efficiency in the EU Emissions Trading Scheme 
In brief, the main findings from the (primarily) theoretical literature presented in 
this sub-section suggest that auctions tend to be associated with higher innova-
tion effects than the typical grandfathering, where allowances are allocated free 
of charge based on historical emissions. Allocating allowances for free, how-
ever, is politically more palatable since the costs for companies directly covered 
by the EU ETS are lower.16 
Outcomes for phase 2 
The Directive allows Member States to auction off up to 5 % of the ET-budget in 
phase 1 and up to 10 % in phase 2. Compared to phase 1, where only four 
Member States (Denmark, Hungary, Ireland and Lithuania) chose to auction off 
parts of their ET-budget, more Member States (so far 9 Member States) intend 
to do so in phase 2 (but not Denmark). However, the shares to be auctioned 
tend to be well below the maximum share of 10 % allowed by the ETS Directive 
in phase 2. While in phase 1 the total auction share in the EU ETS was only 
around 0.2 %, in phase 2 it will be about 3.1 % of total allocation, a figure which 
is mainly driven by the high level of auctioning in the Germany and the UK. As 
was already the case in phase 1, no Member State considered early auctions to 
provide early price signals in phase 2. 
As can be seen from the Annex, most Member States allocate allowances to 
existing installations for free based on historical emissions. Also, most Member 
States use data from the year 2005 (updating) to determine the number of 
EUAs to be allocated to individual installations (through base periods extending 
to 2005). One reason for this violation of the guidance provided by the EC 
(CEC, 2005) may be that verified emissions data at the level of installations 
were readily available for 2005. 
Thus, the low auctioning share in phase 2 is unlikely to substantially advance 
energy efficiency via improved incentives for replacing inefficient technologies, 
early price signals or the diffusion effect. Likewise, updating may have resulted 
in reduced energy efficiency in phase 1 and – if participants expect updating for 
                                            
16  See also Bovenberg and Goulder (2002) and Bovenberg et al. (2005), who empirically and 
theoretically analyze the adverse distributional effects of auctioning emission allowances 
for emission-related industries. By the same token, profit losses of these industries may be 
avoided through the free allocation of emission allowances. However, the higher the 
abatement requirements, the higher the efficiency costs of such compensating policies be-
cause they force the government to forego auctioning revenue and – in the absence of 
lump sum taxation – to rely more heavily on regular distorting taxes.  Incentives for energy efficiency in the EU Emissions Trading Scheme  21 
 
future periods to continue – may also bias companies’ investment decisions 
against energy efficiency.  
Since prices for EUAs are expected to be higher than in phase 1, the pass 
through of carbon costs will result in stronger incentives for demand-side energy 
efficiency in phase 2 of the EU ETS – independent of whether allowances are 
allocated for free or auctioned off. According to the study by Sijm et al. (2006) 
for selected EU Member States, the pass-through rates for wholesale electricity 
prices vary between 60 % and 100 %, depending on the country, market struc-
ture, demand elasticity, load type (base and peak load) and CO2-price consid-
ered. Similarly, Honkatukia et al (2006) found average pass-through rates for 
Finland of 75 % to 95 %. Both studies find evidence that pass through rates are 
lower for base load than for peak load. One possible reason is that non-fossil 
generation technologies compete with fossil fuel technologies more effectively 
at low loads so that fossil fuel technologies would risk losing all the market if 
they passed on 100 % of the costs (Reinaud, 2007). Similarly, because of start-
up costs, power stations may prefer to operate during off-peak periods (Sijm et 
al., 2006). As a consequence, additional incentives for energy efficiency may be 
distributed asymmetrically across customer groups. In addition, since the addi-
tional costs for carbon may – in some power markets – affect the merit order of 
peak and off-peak technologies (see for example, Keats and Neuhoff, 2005), 
the price difference for peak and off peak demand may change. Such a change 
would also alter demand-side incentives, e.g. for load management measures.  
Based on a review of the scarce literature available so far on this topic, a recent 
study by the International Energy Agency concludes that “there is no universal 
answer on how the EU ETS has affected electricity prices” (Reinaud, 2007, p. 
6). First, there is no single EU electricity market, but several market and regula-
tory frameworks across the EU Member States. In particular, not all electricity 
prices in Europe are set on the wholesale market (e.g. via power exchanges). In 
fact, the bulk of electricity is traded through long-term (financial or physical) con-
tracts, where the effects of wholesale prices are probably only indirect. Second, 
since there is no data available on companies’ bidding strategies, or on mar-
ginal suppliers to the market, the exact level of carbon cost pass-through to the 
electricity price cannot be determined. Finally, besides carbon prices, many 
other factors affect generation prices including high natural gas prices or the 
influence of market power in the power market. 22  Incentives for energy efficiency in the EU Emissions Trading Scheme 
3.2 Conventional  grandfathering and benchmarking for ex-
isting installations 
Under benchmarking, allocation is based on specific emission values per unit of 
production (e.g. kg CO2/MWh electricity or t CO2/t cement clinker) for a particu-
lar group of products or installations. The actual number of allowances can be 
derived from the specific benchmark multiplied by past or predicted installation-
specific or standardized activity rates. Average benchmarks are calculated as 
the activity-weighted average of emission values for a particular group and re-
sult in a higher allocation for all companies than benchmarks based on the best-
available technology (BAT-benchmarks).17 Benchmarking favors carbon-
efficient installations over less carbon-efficient installations, since operators of 
the latter need to purchase missing allowances on the market or have fewer 
excess allowances. There are various reasons why benchmarking allocation 
may be preferable to allocation based on historical emissions. First, since 
benchmarking favors installations with low emission values and accounts for 
early action, the allocation outcome is perceived as “fair”. Second, compared to 
conventional grandfathering, benchmarking provides reduced incentives for 
companies to act strategically when there is “updating” (see also Sterner and 
Muller, 2006) because allocation is not based on an individual installation’s 
emission value. As a result, the operators’ incentives to behave strategically to 
affect the future endowment of EUAs are limited and disincentives for improved 
energy and carbon efficiency are reduced. In terms of energy efficiency, 
benchmarking provides a greater incentive to replace old, inefficient installations 
than conventional grandfathering, if – as is usually the case for the EU ETS in 
most Member States – closures lead to a termination of allocation (Cremer and 
Schleich, 2006). These incentives are similar to the incentives for replacement 
provided by auctioning, but not as strong. 
Outcomes for phase 2 
Several countries like Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Italy, Latvia, Spain, 
Sweden and the UK base allocation for some existing installations – mostly 
power installations – on benchmarks (see Annex). Typically, these benchmarks 
                                            
17  This reasoning implicitly assumes that the budget for installations receiving a benchmark-
ing allocation is not fixed. If the budget were fixed, allocation would be independent of the 
benchmark level because a compliance factor would be applied to exactly balance the 
budget. In this case, allocation to an installation would correspond to that installation’s ac-
tivity rate share.  Incentives for energy efficiency in the EU Emissions Trading Scheme  23 
 
are further differentiated by fuels and technologies.18 Apart from France and 
Denmark, these countries did not use benchmarks to allocate EUAs to existing 
installations in phase 1. 
Thus, the increased use of benchmarks for allocating allowances to existing 
installations compared to phase 1 can be expected to accelerate the replace-
ment of old carbon-intensive existing technologies which should increase the 
energy efficiency of installations covered by the EU ETS.  
3.3  Allocation rules for new projects 
The logic of emissions trading requires that all the allowances for new projects 
(i.e. new installations and capacity extensions of existing installations) be pur-
chased at market prices, since investment decisions can then be based on the 
full social costs covered by the scheme (i.e. private costs plus environmental 
costs). Allocating allowances for free to new projects amounts to subsidizing 
investments (over-capacity) and output (Spulber, 1985; Ellerman, 2008; Åhman 
et al., 2007) and distorts the incentives for investing in less carbon-intensive 
technologies in the long run (Betz et al., 2004, Matthes et al., 2005, Neuhoff et 
al., 2006,). In the power sector, for example, these subsidies lead to lower 
power prices and reduced incentives to improve demand-side energy efficiency, 
ceteris paribus. Likewise, basing the allocation to new projects on BAT-values 
for individual installations, or on BAT-benchmarks for homogenous products or 
processes where the benchmarks are further differentiated by fuel types or 
technologies implies subsidization of particular technologies. Such differentia-
tion further reduces the cost-saving potential of emissions trading schemes be-
cause innovation incentives are then limited to the sub-groups. In contrast, if 
companies had to purchase all the allowances for new projects, they would 
have strong incentives to implement energy-efficient, low-carbon technologies 
because these technologies do not require as many allowances.19 
                                            
18  The Netherlands, Flanders and Wallonia, where allocation is based on Covenants or voluntary 
agreements, use BAT-benchmarks for existing installations. However, as in phase 1, they use 
benchmarks to calculate the efficiency factor (i.e. difference between BAT and actual efficiency) 
which is used in the allocation formula (see Annex). 
19   However, under the current closure rules, which essentially provide an output subsidy to 
incumbent installations (see below), free allocation to new entrants may be considered 
second best because it counters the bias against closure (Åhman and Holmgren, 2006). 24  Incentives for energy efficiency in the EU Emissions Trading Scheme 
Outcomes for phase 2 
While the Commission would have preferred newcomers to purchase allow-
ances on the market (CEC, 2003b), in all Member States new projects receive 
allowances for free from a new entrants’ reserve in phase 1 and in phase 2. Al-
location typically occurs on a first-come-first-served basis. Only power plants in 
the Swedish power sector will have to buy all their allowances on the market. As 
in phase 1, gratis allocation in most Member States is typically based on BAT-
values for individual installations or on BAT-benchmarks for homogenous prod-
ucts (or technologies). BAT-benchmarks are common in the energy sector, 
where they tend to be differentiated by fuel inputs. So far, only Denmark, Lux-
embourg, Sweden, Flanders and Wallonia in Belgium and the UK are applying 
uniform benchmarks, which give clearer incentives to invest in the most carbon- 
and energy-efficient technology than differentiated benchmarks. To speed up 
the diffusion of new combined heat and power plants, some Member States are 
applying a “double benchmark” for heat and electricity (e.g. Belgium, Germany, 
Italy, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxemburg, Poland and Slovenia). If BAT-
benchmarks are used for new projects in industry sectors, they tend to be tech-
nology-specific, and often assume gas as the fuel input (e.g. Latvia, UK). Some-
times, product groups are further split into sub-groups (e.g. different types of 
tiles or glass in Germany). So far, empirical results on the effects of free alloca-
tion to new entrants are scarce. Findings for Denmark, where capacity is used 
as the activity rate, imply that this allocation rule has indeed led to investments 
in over-dimensioned boilers (Danish Ministry of the Environment, 2007).  
In sum, the current allocation rules for new projects tend to be detrimental to 
carbon and energy efficiency for two main reasons. First, allocating allowances 
for free amounts to subsidizing output which in turn leads to lower product 
prices and – in case of electricity – to reduced incentives for demand-side en-
ergy efficiency. Second, benchmark differentiation (for demand- and supply-side 
technologies) fails to provide the optimal incentives for developing and adopting 
the most energy- and carbon-efficient technologies. 
3.4  Allocation rules for closures 
From an economic perspective, closures of installations should not alter their 
allocation. In contrast, if allocation is terminated after closure, companies do not 
properly account for the true opportunity costs. Since they lose the allocated 
allowances, the costs to the company of closing an installation are higher than 
the socially optimal costs. As a consequence, old plants may continue to be Incentives for energy efficiency in the EU Emissions Trading Scheme  25 
 
operated too long and new investments may be postponed (Spulber, 1985; Åh-
man et al., 2007). In terms of energy efficiency, this inhibits the diffusion of en-
ergy-efficient technologies. Stopping allocation because of closure corresponds 
to an output subsidy, and consequently there will be too many companies (and 
inefficient installations) in the market. As is typically the case in other cap-and-
trade systems (e.g. Ellerman et al., 2003), operators should continue to receive 
the intended quantity of allowances even after closure. In contrast, in both 
phases of the EU ETS, most Member States decided to end the distribution of 
allowances with the year an installation closes. Arguably, the main reason is 
that Member States were concerned that operators might shut down installa-
tions, keep the allocation, and open a new plant in another country. Another 
reason is that Member States linked existing operating permits with the permit 
to emit greenhouse gases (see Betz et al., 2006a). Consequently, allocation 
has to stop once the operation permit ceases to apply. For phase 2, Cyprus, 
Flanders and Malta, among others, joined Greece, Hungary, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands, Poland, and the UK, which continue to include a so-called transfer 
rule for new installations replacing closed installations. 26  Incentives for energy efficiency in the EU Emissions Trading Scheme 
4 Conclusions 
The concluding section summarizes the main results, provides guidance for the 
future design of the EU ETS (and possibly other emission trading schemes) and 
relates the main findings of the paper to the recent proposal by the European 
Commission for a new Directive governing phase 3 (2013-2020) of the EU ETS 
(CEC, 2008a).  
Macro level  
Our analysis at the macro level suggests that, on average, ET-budgets for 
phase 2 are about 12.8% lower than historical emissions in 2005, 12.9 % lower 
than the budgets in phase 1 (2005-2007) and 15.7  % lower than projected 
emissions in 2010. Thus, the ET-budgets for phase 2 are much stricter than for 
phase 1. Consequently, prices for EUAs are expected to be higher and the in-
centives to improve carbon efficiency as well as primary and end use energy 
efficiency should be stronger in phase 2 than in phase 1. Prices for EUAs for 
phase 2 of currently around 20  € support this view. The tighter budgets for 
phase 2 are primarily the outcome of the European Commission’s decision to 
substantially cut the ET-budgets in the notified NAPs rather than the result of 
Member States’ efforts to curtail greenhouse gas emissions using the EU ETS. 
The adjustments imposed by the European Commission also lead to a more 
cost-efficient split of the required reduction efforts between the ET-sectors and 
other sectors. For most countries, the improvements in carbon and energy effi-
ciency which are implicit in the accepted ET-budgets in the ET-sector should 
result in lower overall costs than the budgets in the notified NAPs. However, our 
analysis shows that reduction requirements in the ET-sectors may still be lim-
ited as companies (and governments) are permitted to use substantial amounts 
of credits from the Kyoto Mechanisms. Eventually though, the extent to which 
these credits will be used by companies depends on the prices for EUAs (in-
cluding expected prices for phase 3) and for credits from Joint Implementation 
and Clean Development Mechanism projects.  
By applying a harmonized rule, the European Commission’s decisions on the 
size of the ET-budgets effectively imply a centralized setting of the cap. Simi-
larly, according to the European Commission’s proposal for phase 3, the future 
EU ETS will no longer require National Allocation Plans. Instead there will be an 
EU-wide cap which corresponds to a reduction of 21 % in 2020 compared to 
2005 emissions. To achieve the European Union’s greenhouse gas emission 
reduction target of 20 % by 2020 compared to 1990 emission levels (or 14 % Incentives for energy efficiency in the EU Emissions Trading Scheme  27 
 
compared to 2005 levels), the aggregate reduction target for the non-ETS sec-
tor in the EU 27 is 10 % for 2020 compared to 2005 emission levels. To deter-
mine the size of the ET-budget for each year in phase 2, the average ET-budget 
of all Member States in phase 2 will be reduced linearly by 1.74 % from 2010 
on. Unlike the EU-wide ET-budget, the target for the non-ETS sector is further 
broken down into individual non-ETS sector targets for Member States. These 
range from reductions of 20  % for Ireland, Denmark and Luxembourg to in-
creases of 19 % and 20 % for Rumania and Bulgaria, respectively. According to 
the proposed Directive, the reduction targets for the ET sector and the non-ET 
sector correspond to a cost-efficient split of the overall reduction burden in the 
EU. Thus the EU ETS can be expected to provide improved incentives for cost-
efficient carbon and energy efficiency for the ETS and non-ETS sectors in the 
future. The use of Kyoto Mechanisms will be limited in the sense that compa-
nies may transfer any unused part of the credit limits from phase 2 into phase 3. 
According to the proposed Directive, credits from projects which reduce green-
house gas emissions in non-ETS-sectors could also be used to cover EU ETS 
emissions if they meet certain criteria, e.g. no double-counting of emission re-
ductions. Having been debated for quite a while as “domestic offset projects”, 
this supplementary flexibility mechanism now termed “Community-level pro-
jects” could provide additional financial incentives for investments in energy effi-
ciency outside the EU ETS sector (Betz et al., 2006b).  
Further, phase 3 is scheduled to last for eight years (2013 - 2020) rather than 
five. In addition, the linear factor of 1.74 % will be applied to determine the size 
of the ET-budget until 2025 unless a review by the European Commission 
states otherwise. Compared to the reduction path implied by the ET-budget for 
phase 2 (12.9  % compared to 2005 emissions), the ET-budget for phase 3 
seems to be less stringent. The proposed new Directive also provides some 
flexibility: Once an international Post-Kyoto agreement is reached, the ET-
budgets and the targets for the non-ETS sectors will be adjusted, and the in-
creased use of credits from the Kyoto Mechanisms in phase 3 will be permitted. 
Since longer phases better match companies’ investment cycles, and reduce 
uncertainty about the profitability of new investments, they are likely to increase 
the diffusion and development of carbon- and energy-efficient technologies. 
Longer phases, however, also limit the system’s flexibility to react to unex-
pected developments, such as technological breakthroughs, sudden changes in 
climate policy, or improved knowledge about the causes and effects of climate 
change. To address this trade-off, the proposals of the States (National Emis-
sions Trading Taskforce, 2006) and the former Howard government (Prime Min-28  Incentives for energy efficiency in the EU Emissions Trading Scheme 
isterial Task Group on Emissions Trading, 2007) for an Australian ETS includes 
the setting of ET-budgets together with upper and lower bounds for future 
budgets. These gateways are subject to regular reviews. As an alternative, Is-
mer and Neuhoff (2006) propose that governments issue put options on the 
price of allowances. Such options would give investors in energy efficiency the 
right, but not the obligation, to sell allowances to the government at a pre-
determined (strike) price. Such provisions would improve planning stability with-
out compromising flexibility at the macro level. 
Inter-temporal flexibility of the ETS is also determined by banking rules. Unlike 
the first phase, the transfer of left-over EUAs into future phases will no longer 
be restricted. Allowing banking is expected to accelerate the diffusion of energy-
efficient technologies if future prices for EUAs are high compared to current 
mitigation costs. However, since the transferred allowances may be used to 
cover emissions in the future, banking may slow down energy efficiency in later 
phases (Phanaeuf and Requate, 2002). 
To sum up, future allowance prices are expected to be substantially higher than 
in phase 1 resulting in stronger cost and price incentives for carbon and energy 
efficiency in installations in the ETS sector. To the extent that companies from 
these sectors (notably power producers) pass through the extra costs for car-
bon, higher prices for allowances also translate into stronger incentives for de-
mand-side energy efficiency. However, cost and price incentives may not be 
sufficient to overcome market failures and other barriers to energy efficiency 
such as information and other transaction costs, split-incentives (landlord-tenant 
problem), or bounded rationality on the part of the investors. These barriers may 
prevent energy efficiency measures from being realized, even when they are 
cost-efficient under current economic conditions (e.g. Jaffe and Stavins, 
1994a,b; Brown, 2001; Ostertag, 2003 or Sorrell et al., 2004). As a conse-
quence, additional policies will have to be implemented to trigger sufficient im-
provements in end-use energy efficiency (e.g. Bertoldi et al., 2005). For small 
and medium sized companies and the public sector, measures to overcome 
these barriers include (but are not limited to) contracting via energy services 
companies, implementing energy management systems, promoting public-
private energy efficiency funds or financing packages and energy audits. Simi-
larly, for the household sector, building codes, labeling and minimum energy 
performance standards for appliances, or tradable white certificate schemes 
may be suitable measures to overcome these barriers (see also CEC, 2006d). 
Such demand-side measures will also reduce emissions from EU ETS installa-
tions such as large power and heat plants and reduce prices for EUAs, ceteris Incentives for energy efficiency in the EU Emissions Trading Scheme  29 
 
paribus. These effects are likely to differ across load-types and energy compa-
nies and they may also change break-even points for conversion technologies. 
Micro level 
Within the constraints of the EU ETS Directive, Member States were given the 
opportunity to alter allocation rules at the micro level between phases 1 and 2 in 
order to incorporate lessons learnt during the first phase. Comparing the alloca-
tion rules between phases 1 and 2 shows mixed results in terms of increased 
incentives for carbon and energy efficiency with substantial differences across 
Member States. A general “path dependency” of allocation rules can be ob-
served, i.e. Member States tend to keep the allocation concepts and method-
ologies applied in phase 1. Improvements in terms of carbon and energy effi-
ciency include an increase in auctioning and the increased application of 
benchmarks for existing and new energy installations, in particular in the power 
sector in EU-15 Member States.  
Even though the share of allowances to be auctioned in phase 2 (3.1%) is 
higher than in phase 1 (0.2%), it still falls considerably short of the maximum 
level of 10 % permitted by the Directive and cannot be expected to have sub-
stantial effects on innovation. According to the Directive proposal by the EC, full 
auctioning should be the rule for the power sector starting in 2013. For industrial 
installations participating in the EU ETS, there should be a gradual transition 
towards full auctioning in 2020 starting with free allocation of 80 % of their share 
in 2013. However, possible exceptions via free allocation or via tax adjustments 
for imports and exports at the border are foreseen for installations in sectors 
which are exposed to a significant risk of carbon leakage20. A decision on such 
a measure will be made by 2011. So, initially, about 2/3 of all allowances would 
be auctioned off in phase 3 (CEC, 2008a). For non-power installations (and for 
heat generated by CHP plants), the transitional free allocation is scheduled to 
be based on harmonized EU allocation rules, such as EU-wide BAT-
benchmarks, but the exact rules may not be known until 2011. Thus, for power 
installations and – depending on the extent of benchmark differentiation – also 
for non-power installation, the future allocation rules in the EU ETS can be ex-
pected to provide stronger incentives to replace inefficient technologies. In addi-
                                            
20  Total emissions may increase if production is displaced to regions where companies are 
not subject to climate policy regulations and where production is more carbon-intensive 
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tion, the new Directive may indirectly spur innovation in energy efficiency since 
20 % of the revenues from auctioning shall be used, among other things, for 
research and development in energy efficiency.  
Similarly, the observed increase between phase 1 and phase 2 in the use of 
benchmarks and standard utilization rates for allocation to new projects im-
proves efficiency compared to using installation-specific emission values. These 
are still the dominant rule in new Member States even though operators con-
tinue to have an incentive to predict "optimistic" activity rates as was the case in 
phase 1 (Grubb and Ferrario, 2006). Nevertheless, benchmarks which are dif-
ferentiated by fuels, technologies or activity rates, distort dynamic innovation 
incentives. The Directive proposal for phase 3 requires harmonized allocation 
rules for new projects in order to level the playing field and to overcome a pos-
sible prisoners’ dilemma situation resulting from Member States’ strategic incen-
tive to attract new projects through favorable allocation. Also, incumbent instal-
lations and new entrants are to be treated alike. Accordingly, new power instal-
lations will not receive free allowances and the allocation to new non-power in-
stallations should be the same as for existing non-power installations. Thus, 
power production will no longer be subsidized, and – to the extent that old in-
stallations and the new ones replacing them receive the same allocation – in-
centives to close installations are no longer distorted.  
To sum up, the incentives for carbon and energy efficiency generated through 
the EU ETS have significantly improved at the macro level, but only slightly at 
the micro level between phase 1 and phase 2. The European Commission’s 
proposal for phase 3 implies increased incentives for carbon and energy effi-
ciency, in particular at the micro level. The actual effects will depend on the final 
outcome of the policy making process which includes the Council and the Euro-
pean Parliament and on the detailed allocation rules for industry installations. 
From a carbon and energy efficiency point of view, these rules should be guided 
by uniform BAT-benchmarks during the transition to full auctioning. Since provi-
sions for the new category of “Community-level projects” allow companies to 
use credits from domestic projects in the non-ETS sectors to cover their emis-
sions, abatement efforts and costs between the ET- and the non-ET-sectors will 
be linked. Thus, these projects may represent an additional channel for im-
proved incentives for energy efficiency via the EU ETS.  
Finally, while the analysis presented in this paper is – to a large extent – con-
fined to a comparison between “economic theory” and “observed rules in the EU 
ETS”, future research may link “economic theory” , “observed rules” and “ob-Incentives for energy efficiency in the EU Emissions Trading Scheme  31 
 
served outcomes”. Such analyses would make it possible to assess to what ex-
tent the diverse set of incentives created by the EU ETS actually result in im-
proved energy efficiency.  
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Acronyms 
BAT  Best Available Technology 
BM Benchmark 
CCGT  Combined Gas Cycle Turbines 
CDM  Clean Development Mechanism 
CHP  Combined Heat and Power 
CITL  Community Independent Transaction Log 
CO2e CO2 equivalents 
EC European  Commission 
ET Emissions  Trading 
EU European  Union 
EUA   European Union Allowance 
EU ETS  EU Emissions Trading Scheme 
JI Joint  Implementation 
KM  Kyoto Mechanisms (i.e. JI, CDM) 
NAP  National Allocation Plan 
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c) CHP bonus 
a) b) projected 
emissions (not 
















a) based on fuel-specific BAT-
benchmarks*average capacity 
use (2000-2005); if installed 
after 2003, BAT-BM * (standard-
ized load factors);  
+ CF if ET-budget too small; no 
CF if installation meets BAT;  
b) average emissions 2000-
2005 * CF (=0.9875)   
c) double benchmark *average 
capacity use (2002-2005) 































a) fossil power production 
(1998-2004 or 2004 if emissions 
for 2004> average for 1998-
2004) * uniform BM (0.388 
tCO2/MWh) * (includes CF: 
electricity: 0.57)  
IA heat = similar as b) 
b) IA (incl. offshore) = combus-
tion emissions (1998-2004 or 
2004 if 2004 > average 1998-
2004) * CF (0.87) + process 
emissions (1998-2004 or 2004 if 
2004 > average 1998-2004) * 
CF (0.98) 
c) based on a) and b) and distri-
bution between heat and elec-
tricity is based on 125 % thermal 
efficiency 
a) if capacity ex-
pansions > 10 MW 
and full load hours 
> 1000h/a  
IA electricity = ca-
pacity * load factor 
(if 2000-2999 h/a 
CF = 2/3; if 1000-
1999 h/a CF = 1/3) 
* BAT-BM (1185 
tCO2/MW) 
IA heat = 
cap.*BAT-BM (100 
tCO2/MW) 
b) capacity * uni-
form BAT-BM * CF 
(same as existing 
installations) 
BAT-benchmarks 
have been reduced 
compared to NAP 






and heat (305 














(0%)    
a) b) emissions 1995-2005 (dis-
trict heating) or 2000-2005 (elec-
tricity and industry) * growth 
factor (= 6.5% for electricity/3% 
for district heating and industry) 
- no CF 
c) increase in CHP rewarded as 
early action 
a) no information 
on allocation 
method   
















a) installation capacity * load 
factor * BAT benchmark (tech-
nology specific) * CF (=0.746)   
b) avg. specific emissions * out-
put (2 yrs from 2000-2005) * 
install.-specific CF   
c) projected emissions (based 
on VET 2005) 
a) same rules as for 
existing installa-
tions  
b) BAT BM * pro-
jected output 2008-

















a) fuel consumption (2000-2003) 
[peak load and reserve capacity 
(1998-2002)] * installation-
specific BM * CF (condensing 
power: 0.33 / peak load and 
reserve capacity: 0.9 / district 
heating: 0.8) 
b) process emissions*CF (0.95) 
+ combustion emissions (incl. 
industrial power prod.) (1998-
2002) * CF (0.9) 
c) emissions (1998-2002) * CF 
(0.8); CF for CHP in industry is 
0.9 
a) b) c) fuel input * 
sector specific load 
factor * fuel specific 
emissions factor * 
















a) b) SB: production 
(2004/2005) * growth rate * av-
erage benchmark 
(2004/2005)*reduction potential 
* CF (=0.9729);  
IA: installation’s share of emis-
sions in BP (varying: 1996 to 
2005, sometimes one single 
year)  
c) no 
a) b) based on BAT 
benchmarks 
(gas)*projected 
output; list of 
benchmarks to be 
set up  
c) no 















a) b) average emissions 2000-
2004 (without lowest year) * 
sector-specific CF (<1); “Fuel 
coefficient” used for other com-
bustion, paper and cardboards, 
lime and ceramics; special rules 
for steel and cement 
c) CF = 1 
a) b) capacity * load 
factor * specific 
emission factor * 
sector specific CF 
for existing installa-
tions (if specific 
emission factor is 
BAT, CF=1) 
c) CF=1 and spe-
















a) share of sector emissions 
based on heat and electricity 
output (2004-2006) * average 
emissions factor of fuel mix in 
2005 * inverse BAT efficiency 
(output/input fuel in %) * 1.05 if 
CHP + emissions from SO2 
scrubbers in 2005 + bonus for 
district heat production with 
domestic fuel 
b) Share of sector emissions 
(2005); exceptions for sugar, 
cement, lime, glass and brick 
industry 
c) CHP factor of 1.05 + bonus 
for production of district heat 
with domestic fuel 
a) c) expected pro-
duction (based on 
previous operation) 
* fuel specific BAT 
BM (coal and lignite 




duction (based on 
previous operation) 















a) b) share of emissions (2003-
2004) * total sector budget  
c) electricity part: allowances 
from energy budget based on 
CCGT BAT-benchmark (gas) 
a) b) based on  
BAT (differentiated 




at 88% of projected 
emissions) 














a) output 2005 * (fuel - & tech-
nology-specific BAT BM) * (trend 
factor) * CF (=0.9897);  
b) allocation 2007 *(1 + 0.03 * 
individual efficiency factor + 
0.03* individual growth factor) * 
CF: CF sector-specific 
c) CHP similar to a) but double 
benchmark (heat = 350 g/kWh) * 
0.85 (energy savings)  
a) capacity * load 
factor * fuel- and 
technology-specific 
BM (same as for 
incumbents)  
b) output projec-
tions or capacity 
and expected use * 
BAT benchmark (to 
be defined) 
c) double bench-
mark * 0.85 (energy 

















a) b) SB = average emissions 
(2002-2005)* projected growth * 
efficiency factor (=0.9 for en-
ergy/=0.9 to 1.0 for industry) * 
0.95 (auction factor); refineries: 
emissions increase due to legis-
lation by 1.153  
Share of SB based on: 2 * fuel 
consumption in toe (2002-2005) 
* 0.5 tCO2/toe;  if applicable: 
process-related emissions, 2 
*”early action bonus” and 2 * 
“CHP bonus”  
c) double benchmark 




























a) b) average emissions (3 yrs. 
from 2002-2005) * growth factor 
* CF (=0.991)  
c) no  
a) b) based on 
uniform BAT BM 
and standardized 
load factors   
c) double bench-















a) b) average output in sector-
specific BP (varies between 
2001 and 2006) * (fuel-and 
product-specific benchmarks) * 
growth factor* CF (= 0.98) 
c) double benchmark 
a) b) based on 


















a) Business as usual projections 
* energy efficiency potential and 
planned contribution from re-
newables  
b) c) no installations 
a) b) capacity * 
planned load factor 

























a) average emissions (3 yr. from 
2000-2005) * growth factor * 
efficiency factor * CF(=0.73) 
*efficiency factor (covenant-
based) - CF includes 0.15 cut for 
windfall profits)   
b) IA= emissions (3 yrs. from 
2000-2005) * growth factor (1.7) 
* efficiency factor * CF (=0.87 
combustion emissions /=0.92 for 
process emissions)   
c) efficiency benchmark, no CF 
for small CHP 
a) b) based on BAT 
BM (covenant) * 
projected output 
(capped at 90%)   
c) additional alloca-
tion for expanding 











10% (20.9)  1%  
(0%) 
a) projected output * fuel specific 
benchmarks, accounting for SO2  
b) sector average benchmarks 
(2005) * efficiency factor * pro-
jected output agreed with asso-
ciations + CHP and early action 
bonus   
c) fuel-specific double bench-
mark  
a) b) based on -
BAT-BM* projected 
output   

















a) installations share of emis-
sions (3 yrs. from 2000-2004 or 
if growth > 20% 2 yrs. from 
2002-2004); for CCGT use pro-
jected emissions 
b) heat production (3 yrs. from 
2000-2004 or if growth > 20% 2 
yrs. from 2002-2004) * emis-
sions factor (max. emissions 
factor: [installation BM + sector 
BM ]/2 or min. emissions factor 
in case high biomass use) + 
process emissions (3 yrs. from 
2000-2004 or if growth > 20% 2 
yrs. from 2002-2004), for steel 
and refinery use projections 
c) indirectly through max. emis-
sion factor 
a) b) c) installed 
capacity * sub-
sector technology 
and fuel specific 
load factor * uni-

















a) SB = historic emissions * 
GDP growth* carbon intensity of 
each of 8 sectors 
b) SB= same as a) but co-
generation bonus and JI reserve 
subtracted 
a)b) IA= installations share of 
emissions of SB (average of top 
2 years in 2001-2004) * continu-
ity factor (takes growth in 2007 
compared to base period into 
account) + early action bonus  
c) same as b) and CHP bonus 
instead of early action bonus for 
eligible installations 
a)b) 95% * installa-
tion-specific pro-







c) same as above 
but with factor of 
99% 














a) avg. emissions in (1998 – 
2001) * CF (=0.3 to 0.4) 
b) all, except BOF-steel: IA= 
emissions in (1998-2001) * 
growth in process-related emis-
sions * CF(=1);  BOF-steel: pro-
jected output * EU avg. bench-
mark (2005)  
c) CF=1  
a) c) free allocation 
only to highly-
efficient CHP, 
based on uniform 
average benchmark 




jected output  


































a) CHP and CCGT: grandfather-
ing factor * share of emissions 
(2002-2005) of sub-sector 
budget + BM-factor * fuel- and 
technology-specific BAT (follows 
BREF for existing LCP; grand-
fathering factor: 1.0 in 2008-
2010, 0.7 in 2011 and 0.5 in 
2012.  
peak and reserve capacity: pro-
jected emissions * CF(=0.88) 
b) (incl. industrial CHP) IA= 
process emissions (2002-2005) 
*CF(=1.02) + [0.7 * combustion 
emissions (2002-2005) + 0.3 * 
fuel specific BM + if applicable, 
CHP-bonus] * CF (= 0.945) 
if IA > projected emissions dif-
ferent formula used 
c) double BM for a) and CHP 
bonus (=0,1 t/MWhe) for b) 
a) b) projected 
output * fuel- and 
technology-specific 
BAT-BM * CF (0.9) 
+ projected output * 
process BAT (indiv. 
assessment) 
Max. number of 
EUAs p.a. per new 
entrant = 14.000.  
a) heat (boiler): 
installed capacity * 
projected load fac-
tor (max. 4000 h/a) 
* uniform BM (200 
g/kWh) *CF (=0.9) 
c) no upper limit of 
allocation and dou-
ble benchmark 
(heat: 200 g/kWh; 
electric-
ity:350 g/kWh) 
                                            

















a) Thermal: avg. emissions in 
1998-2003 (or 2005, if higher) * 
growth of apartment stock 
(=1.004); 
Electric and thermal: projected 
energy output * emissions / out-
put (1998 – 2003)   
b) large emitters: negotiated; 
small emitters: emissions (1998 
– 2005) * sector-specific growth 
rates   
c) no 
a) b) based on 
projected emissions 
or BAT (fuel- and 
technology-specific 
but not specified 























a) capacity * standardized load 
factor (2000-2003) * technology- 
and fuel-based benchmark  
b) sector budget * installation’s 
share of emissions in 3 yrs. out 
of 2000-2003  
c) separate “good quality CHP 
sector” 
a) based on uni-
form BM (CCGT) * 
standardized load 
factor * CF (=0.7)   
b) based on uni-
form benchmark 
(gas - if  applicable) 
* standardized load 
factor * CF (=0.9 
boilers and genera-
tors/= 0.95 other)  
c) see a) CF=1    
Note:   BAT = Best Available Technology, BAU = Business as Usual; BM = Benchmark;  
CHP = Combined Heat and Power; CF = compliance factor, BOF = basic oxygen fur-
nace; IA = Installation Allocation, N.A. = not available SA = Sector Allocation 
Source:   NAPs of Member States and NAP decisions of European Commission 
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